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Objective 
 
This study aims to analyze policy-related and political rationales for Medicaid expansion 
under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). More specifically, this 
study seeks to discover whether states’ decisions regarding Medicaid expansion were 
likely based on policy implications regarding the uninsured or political motives. 
 
Methodology 
 
The approach is a cross-sectional/observational study of American states and the District 
of Columbia after the Sebelius decision in 2012. This study compares three variables: (1) 
whether each state decided to opt into the expansion (“Opted In”), (2) whether each 
state’s governor and legislature were affiliated with either the Democratic or Republican 
party at the time of its decision (“Party”), and (3) the potential impact of Medicaid 
expansion on the uninsured population of each state (“Uninsured”). “Opted In” is the 
dependent variable; “Party” is the political variable; and “Uninsured” is the policy 
variable. This study utilized analysis of variance (ANOVA), chi-squared testing, and 
hypothesis testing between statistics to analyze relationships between variables. 
 
Results 
 
For the study sample (N = 38), data analysis found statistically significant relationships 
between: (1) uninsured rates and decisions regarding Medicaid expansion; (2) political 
party affiliation and decisions regarding Medicaid expansion; and (3) political party 
affiliation and uninsured rates in respective states. States with higher rates of uninsured 
citizens were less likely to opt into the Medicaid expansion. Republican states were less 
likely to opt into the expansion than Democratic states. Democratic and Republican states 
had statistically different rates of uninsured citizens, with Republican states having higher 
rates than Democratic states. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Results suggest both policy and political motives influence executive and legislative 
decision-making. The direction of influence of policy implications regarding the 
uninsured is inconsistent with PPACA’s policy goal of reducing the uninsured 
population. However, Republican states have higher rates of uninsured citizens than 
Democratic states. Therefore, inconsistencies may be incidental to overall political 
influence and social structure within states. Greater public health advocacy may help to 
overcome political barriers to achieving the policy goals of legislation. 
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Introduction 
In 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (PPACA).1  Two central provisions of PPACA were the individual mandate, 
which requires every citizen to acquire minimal health insurance or face a payment 
requirement to the IRS, and the Medicaid expansion, which extends eligibility for 
Medicaid to those who fall under 138% of the federal poverty level.2-3  Furthermore, 
PPACA declared that every state must opt into the expansion or forfeit the entirety of 
their Medicaid funding from the federal government.3  Leaning on constitutional 
limitations and Tenth Amendment rights, numerous states and private sector 
organizations opposed PPACA and brought suit in federal district court to challenge the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion.4  The Supreme 
Court of the United States granted certiorari to hear the case and came to the 
determination that the individual mandate is constitutional under Congress’s power to 
tax.4  However, the Supreme Court declared that the federal government could not 
compel states to adopt a federal regulatory program like Medicaid.4  The coercive nature 
of the provision led the Supreme Court to declare the Medicaid expansion as 
unconstitutional.4  
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg emphasized the underlying policy of 
PPACA—to assist over 50 million Americans who lack health insurance and to reduce 
the nation’s overall rising health care costs—and concluded that the Medicaid expansion 
provision requires states to do what they have always done; namely, to continue to 
comply with the conditions Congress has set forth to receive Medicaid funds.4 
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Considering such, Justice Ginsburg viewed the Medicaid expansion as constitutional 
under Congress’s power to spend, despite the majority declaring otherwise.4-5 
As evident in a divided Supreme Court regarding the issue of the constitutionality 
of the Medicaid expansion, perspectives vary as to whether the provision served as a 
condition for funding (constitutional) or a coercive restriction on states (unconstitutional). 
Perhaps policy concerns, balanced against constitutional limitations, play a role in 
shaping such perspectives and placing the provision along the continuum of 
constitutionality. In other words, policy may influence decisions to embrace legislation. 
Additionally, all current Supreme Court Justices appointed by Republican administrations 
viewed the Medicaid expansion—proposed by a Democratic administration—as coercive 
and unconstitutional.1, 6-7  The only Justices in support of the provision’s constitutionality 
were appointed by Democratic administrations.6-7  Thus, while exceptionally impartial, 
almost all Supreme Court Justices’ perspectives align with their respective party in 
regards to Medicaid expansion under PPACA. In other words, political motives may 
influence decisions to embrace legislation. This study aims to shed light on whether, and 
to what extent, policy and political motives play such a role at the state level.  
Following Sebelius, states had the decision whether to opt into the Medicaid 
expansion outlined in PPACA, develop an alternative plan—subject to federal 
approval—to expand health insurance coverage under Medicaid, or do neither.8  This 
study will analyze states’ decisions and whether they were likely made based on policy 
implications regarding the uninsured or political motives. In theory, the Medicaid 
expansion had the capacity to provide health insurance to millions of Americans who fall 
under 138% of the federal poverty level.3  If states relied on policy implications regarding 
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the uninsured in their decision whether to opt into the expansion, states with a greater 
percentage of uninsured citizens would be more likely to opt in. However, given that 
PPACA was enacted by a Democratic administration, states might have ignored the 
strong policy reasons for opting in— including providing affordable health insurance to 
eligible citizens—and chosen to opt out based on political reasons.9  
Advocates of public health who believe in the fundamental principle that health is 
a human right would like to see states opting into the expansion because doing so would 
significantly reduce the percentage of uninsured citizens.4, 10-11  While health insurance 
does not guarantee health, it provides coverage which allows access to care; access to 
care promotes health.12-15  Nonetheless, political motives, such as resisting enactments by 
an opponent party, may put up barriers to health care—a fundamental human right.9-11 
This study will compare three variables: (1) whether each state decided to opt into 
the expansion (“Opted In”), (2) whether each state’s governor and legislature were 
affiliated with either the Democratic or Republican party at the time of its decision 
(“Party”), and (3) the potential impact of Medicaid expansion on the uninsured 
population of each state (“Uninsured”). Ultimately, this study aims to answer two 
questions with respect to Medicaid expansion under PPACA. First, is there a relationship 
between policy considerations and executive or legislative decision-making in states? 
Second, is there a relationship between politics and executive or legislative decision-
making in states? 
The proposed study is complicated by the tremendous array of factors that 
influence executive and legislative decisions in states—such as whether to opt into the 
Medicaid expansion under PPACA. In reality, variable interactions and omitted variables 
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probably play a role in decision-making outcomes. Nonetheless, this study aims to 
analyze the two most likely influences—the potential impact on the uninsured and party 
affiliation—on decisions, potentially driven by policy or politics, regarding Medicaid 
expansion. Ultimately, this study may reveal a greater need for public health advocacy in 
order to overcome political barriers to achieving the policy goals of legislation. 
The following analysis includes a comprehensive review of literature pertaining to 
public health, law, and politics. Each topic plays a fundamental role in establishing an 
understanding necessary to conduct a study and interpret results in regards to Medicaid 
expansion under PPACA. Following, data analysis will potentially answer whether, and 
to what extent, policy or political motives influence executive or legislative decision-
making. 
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Literature Review 
The following review of literature summarizes key concepts foundational to 
understanding the complexity of states’ decisions regarding Medicaid expansion under 
PPACA. It represents theoretical and empirical knowledge gathered from the disciplines 
of public health, law, and politics. Cited works come from books, book chapters, journal 
articles, conference papers, and other scholarly publications within the following 
databases and sources: the ACA Implementation Research Network, The Commonwealth 
Fund, EBSCO, Google Scholar, Grey Literature, Health Affairs, LexisNexis, the National 
Academy for State Health Policy (NASPH), The Pew Charitable Trusts, PubMed, 
RAND, and Urban Institute. The search process utilized the following words and phrases: 
healthcare reform; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; uninsured populations; 
health care expenditures, quality, and performance; individual mandate; Medicaid 
expansion; health care coverage; access to care; health care outcomes; prevention; cost 
savings; the paradox of prevention; Sebelius; constitutional law; federalism; Tenth 
Amendment rights; the Taxing and Spending Clause; legislative history of PPACA; 
support for PPACA; opposition to PPACA; state government decision-making; political 
party influence; voting habits; 1115 waivers; subsidized insurance; public choice; 
economics; budget shortages; cost sharing; fiscal capacities; per capita spending; and 
factors affecting political embrace of legislation. Additionally, the following review will 
analyze material cited within works obtained from the search process. 
The first portion of this literature review focuses on public health. It describes the 
American healthcare system and the need for reform, and public health’s role in 
addressing the health status of the population. Policy—including public health policy—
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guided the reform and gave life to PPACA. The second portion focuses on law. Law 
served as the vector for states to challenge PPACA. Additionally, law prompted states to 
decide whether to embrace PPACA. The third portion focuses on politics. Politics likely 
guided states in making their decisions. In short, these three disciplines all fit together in 
the puzzling world of Medicaid expansion: PPACA arose from policy; it was challenged 
in law; law set the stage for politics to operate. The literature review concludes by briefly 
summarizing what is known and unknown about policy and political motives for 
Medicaid expansion in states and articulating this study’s limitations as well as 
contributions to the field. 
 
PUBLIC HEALTH 
The American Healthcare System and PPACA Implementation 
 In years prior to the major insurance provisions of PPACA, health status within 
the United States, and in states such as Kentucky, was less than remarkable. In 2013, the 
United States ranked 37th in the world with respect to health care performance.16  The 
United States’ poor ranking elevates to abysmal considering it spent more on health care 
than any other country in the world.17  In fact, the United States spent twice as much per 
capita as the next highest spending country. However, quality of care and life years 
within the United States ranked significantly lower than many countries that spent less 
per capita on health care.18 
 Many factors contribute to the poor performance and quality of the American 
healthcare system as well as the increased costs it incurs, including lack of coverage. 
Leading up to the healthcare reform under PPACA, approximately 1 in 5 Americans did 
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not have health insurance.19  Thus, a massive proportion of the American people may not 
have utilized health services due to shortcomings in coverage. Such shortcomings 
translate to reduced access to care.13  Avedis Donadebian, a physician and respected 
leader in quality assessment, defined lack of access in itself as poor quality.20  Evident in 
a shift of focus from treatment of acute and chronic conditions to primary care and 
preventive efforts, those uninsured Americans who did seek health services likely sought 
costly emergency services as opposed to cheaper preventive options.21  In other words, 
uninsured Americans sought treatment when they were sick. That type of treatment is 
costlier than preventive efforts and, therefore, contributes to the rising costs of health 
care.21  
In response, the American political system began efforts through policy 
development to improve the patient experience of care, improve the health of 
populations, and reduce the per capita cost of health care.22  PPACA came to life. 
Policy of PPACA 
Signed into law by President Obama in 2010, the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) aims to shift focus from treatment of acute and chronic 
conditions to primary care and preventive efforts. PPACA, in general, aims to assist the 
50 million Americans who lack health insurance and reduce the nation’s overall rising 
health care costs.4  It has two main provisions to accomplish those policy goals: (1) the 
“individual mandate” and (2) the “Medicaid expansion” provisions.2-3  The individual 
mandate provision requires every citizen to acquire minimum health insurance or face a 
payment requirement to the IRS.2  The Medicaid expansion provision extends eligibility 
for Medicaid to those who fall under 138% of the federal poverty level.3  
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Both provisions seek to assist the vast population of uninsured Americans in 
obtaining health insurance. Specifically, the payment requirement for not having 
minimum health insurance under the individual mandate provision incentivizes 
Americans to obtain health insurance. However, some Americans may not have the 
resources to obtain such insurance due to an inability to pay for more expensive options 
and ineligibility for cheaper options. The Medicaid expansion provision assists those 
Americans by extending eligibility for Medicaid to those who fall under 138% of the 
federal poverty level. The expanded eligibility has the capacity to allow for coverage of 
16 million previously uninsured Americans and 400,000 previously uninsured 
Kentuckians.23  
In theory, providing health care coverage to millions of Americans who lacked 
health insurance would facilitate access to care and improve the performance and quality 
of the American healthcare system.4  While health insurance does not guarantee health, it 
provides coverage which allows access; access to care promotes health.12-15  Thus, 
expanded coverage would allow a massive population of uninsured Americans to seek 
care—specifically, primary care and preventive services. Upstream action would keep 
more and more Americans healthy and address the health status of the population. 
PPACA, therefore, is a product of public health policy—characterized by a focus 
on preventive and upstream action to address the health of the population. The public 
health policy of PPACA would serve as a foundation to improve the health status of the 
population. 
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The Paradox of Prevention 
The “paradox of prevention” describes a potential obstacle for spectators of 
American healthcare reform to realize whether the policy goals of PPACA come to 
fruition. In turn, the paradox of prevention may deter support for both PPACA and future 
legislation. 
The paradox of prevention essentially says that the results of preventive efforts 
are not appreciated because they go unnoticed, are not dramatic, and take a long time to 
come to fruition.24-25  How do we quantify what never happened? What do we have to 
show for our efforts? For spectators of American healthcare reform to appreciate reform 
efforts, they must see results. To see results, people must first need care. Thus, people 
must first get sick. However, the policy underlying PPACA focuses more on preventive 
efforts to keep people from getting sick. In theory, if PPACA works, difficulty will arise 
with respect to quantifying improved health outcomes. For example, it is far easier to 
quantify cancer treatment outcomes than it is to show how many people would have 
gotten cancer but did not due to preventive efforts. As a result, the fruits of the preventive 
efforts go unnoticed and, therefore, unappreciated. Lack of appreciation decreases 
support for PPACA and future related legislation. Decreased support hurts political 
agendas. The paradox, therefore, captures the difficulty public health advocates face in 
the political world—a world that thrives from clearly identifiable and quick results, and 
support from constituents. 
Health as a Human Right 
 Despite the tremendous political barriers obstructing the policy agenda, public 
health efforts ensue, achieving and maintaining health for all. Advocates of public health 
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believe in the fundamental principle that health is a human right.10-11  In the context of 
Medicaid expansion, public health advocates would like to see states opting into the 
expansion because doing so would significantly reduce the percentage of uninsured 
citizens.4  At a broader level, opting into the exchange would provide coverage to 
millions of Americans which allows access to care; access to care promotes health—a 
fundamental right in the world of public health.10-15 
 
LAW 
NFIB v. Sebelius 
 Leaning on constitutional limitations and Tenth Amendment rights, numerous 
states and private sector organizations opposed PPACA and brought suit in federal 
district court to challenge the constitutionality of the individual mandate and the 
Medicaid expansion.4  The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to hear 
the case and address the issue of whether Congress has the authority under the 
Constitution to enact the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion provisions.4  
The Supreme Court came to the determination that the individual mandate is 
constitutional under Congress’s power to tax.4  However, the Supreme Court declared 
that the federal government could not compel states to adopt a federal program like 
Medicaid.4  The coercive nature of the provision led the Supreme Court to declare the 
Medicaid expansion as unconstitutional.4  
Following Sebelius, states had the decision whether to opt into the Medicaid 
expansion outlined in PPACA, develop an alternative plan—subject to federal 
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approval—to expand health insurance coverage under Medicaid, or do neither.8 Politics 
likely guided states in making their decisions. 
 
POLITICS 
 “When we say that policies are decided by analysis, we mean than an 
investigation of the merits of various possible actions has disclosed reasons for choosing 
one policy over others. When we say that politics rather than analysis determines policy, 
we mean that policy is set by the various ways in which people exert control, influence, 
or power over each other.”26  
Legislative History of PPACA 
 A Democratic administration developed and enacted the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA).1  Not surprisingly, PPACA saw support from many 
Democratic constituents and opposition from Republicans. For example, former 
Governor Steve Beshear—a Democratic governor in Kentucky—released a statement 
describing PPACA as the “single-most important decision in our lifetime for improving 
the health of Kentuckians.”27  To the contrary, various Republican governors including 
Rick Perry—the governor of Texas—took an early stance against PPACA.28 Governor 
Perry expressed a desire to reform Medicaid on “Texas’ terms,” describing the 
“crushing” weight of Medicaid costs on Texas infrastructure.29  Texas is among many 
other states that enacted laws to oppose the insurance mandates and reform policies of 
PPACA.30 
 Clearly, a broad continuum of perspectives on healthcare reform exists. 
Perspectives emphasize desires to improve the health status of the population, reveal 
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concerns for costs, and raise issues about the autonomy of states in America’s federalist 
scheme. Across all perspectives shines a political gleam. A cursory assessment of the 
landscape of healthcare reform reveals a political divide. While not absolute, Democrats 
predominately express the most support for PPACA. Consistently, Republicans 
predominately display the most opposition to it. Proponents of PPACA and its underlying 
public health policy emphasize its tremendous capacity to improve the health status of the 
population. Opponents focus more on its financial requirements and principles of 
federalism and Tenth Amendment rights; specifically, fiscal capacity to absorb Medicaid 
costs and state autonomy from the federal government. 
Executive and Legislative Decisions at the State Level Regarding PPACA 
 The implementation and progression of PPACA and Medicaid expansion in 
Kentucky aptly captures the relationship between policy and politics in the arena of 
healthcare reform in the states. Following implementation of PPACA in 2010, former 
Democratic Governor Steve Beshear utilized an executive order to expanded coverage 
under Medicaid and establish a state health benefit exchange referred to as “kynect.”31  
Spectators of American healthcare reform often considered Kentucky the “gold standard” 
of implementing healthcare reform under PPACA. Kentucky’s expanded coverage and 
state health benefit exchange allowed for the coverage of hundreds of thousands of 
Kentuckians—significantly reducing the uninsured population. Despite Kentucky’s 
unique success in advancing the policy goals of PPACA, newly elected Republican 
Governor Matthew Bevin announced his plans to uproot the exchange and rollback the 
expanded Medicaid beneficiaries to the federal exchange—costing the commonwealth 
money and significant administrative resources. Upon election, Governor Bevin 
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rescinded former Governor Beshear’s executive order, delivering the death nail to kynect. 
Nonetheless, the Governor announced his Medicaid waiver proposal which, if approved, 
would restore coverage to those who lost it through the repeal of kynect.32  
 Former Governor Beshear adamantly supported PPACA and elected to shepherd 
its implementation in Kentucky through expanded coverage and a state health benefit 
exchange. By doing so, former Governor Beshear advanced the policy goals of PPACA 
of assisting uninsured citizens in obtaining health insurance. However, Governor Bevin—
a Republican governor—decided to ignore the success of Kentucky in the national 
landscape of healthcare reform and repeal the state exchange. In doing so, Governor 
Bevin put Kentucky in a position to incur costs to rollback the expanded Medicaid 
beneficiaries to the federal exchange and deplete administrative resources. Considering 
Kentucky’s tremendous enrollment success, it seems only compelling reasons should 
prompt executive or legislative action to reconsider Kentucky’s efforts in healthcare 
reform. The question then arises why Governor Bevin elected to rescind the former 
Governor’s executive order. A likely explanation is politics. By uprooting kynect, 
Governor Bevin created an opportunity for the Republican agenda to guide healthcare 
reform in Kentucky. This opportunity took the form of a 1115 waiver referred to as 
“Kentucky HEALTH” which the Governor unveiled in a press conference on June 22, 
2016.32  Kentucky HEALTH pleases Republican constituents who wish to see the 
Republican agenda guiding efforts in Kentucky. Moreover, the 1115 waiver still expands 
Medicaid coverage which may please the citizens who otherwise would have lost 
coverage eligibility after the repeal of kynect. With respect to expanded coverage, the 
Governor is advancing the policy goals of PPACA. Although, the section 1115 waiver to 
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the federal Democratic enactment implicates a political resilience to embracing the 
legislation. 
 In summary, policy and political motives likely influence executive and 
legislative decision-making in states. 
State Government Decision-Making 
 An overview of the decision-making process in states is essential to understand 
the complexity of states’ decisions regarding Medicaid expansion under PPACA. Major 
players in state government include the governor—the head of the executive branch—and 
the legislature—the core body of the legislative branch.33  Generally, legislatures develop 
legislation which it may then pass to the governor to sign into law. The governor may 
also enact laws via executive orders which occurs primarily when the legislature is not in 
session. Executive orders allow governors to bypass the legislative process. The governor 
and the legislature do not have to affiliate with the same political party. If the governor 
and legislature affiliate with different parties, that state is referred to as a “split-party” 
state. Split-party states may encounter issues in advancing respective political agendas 
due to conflicting interests.28, 34  Moreover, all members of the legislature in each 
respective state typically do not affiliate with the same party. Overall political affiliation 
of a legislature is determined by the party that preponderates the legislature’s 
composition.35  
 With respect to healthcare reform under PPACA, different avenues for decision-
making and dynamics of party influence may result in cooperation or disjoint between the 
governor and legislature of each state.28  Understanding these dynamics helps to make 
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some sense of the complexity of states’ decisions regarding Medicaid expansion under 
PPACA. 
Political Party Influence 
 Clear evidence of political party influence can be elusive. The ideological nature 
of politics makes it difficult to quantify political influence. Ideas and opinions make up 
politics. Ideas and opinions are subjective and difficult to quantify. Nonetheless, studies 
have attempted to determine how political party influence affects decision-making. 
 A 2003 study in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology found that 
attitudes towards a policy depend almost exclusively on the stance taken by one’s 
political party. The study went on to prioritize (1) the impact of political party influence, 
(2) objective assessment of the policy, and (3) the subjects’ ideological beliefs and found 
political party influence overwhelmed the latter two influences with respect to decision-
making.36  This study finds that political party influence greatly affects one’s decision-
making process. Typically, an individual’s decisions will align with the stance taken by 
the political party with which they affiliate. An article on estimating party influence in 
congressional roll-call voting reached a similar conclusion, quoting “[v]irtually all studies 
. . . find that political party affiliation is one of the best predictor of voting behaviors.”37  
 Another layer of political influence exists with respect to the “range of politics.” 
The range of politics refers to the degree of alignment with a particular issue on a 
continuum ranging from one extreme to another. For example, an anti-abortion extremist 
may have the belief that abortion is never acceptable, under any circumstances. A 
moderate party may have the belief that abortion is generally unacceptable, except under 
certain circumstances. Both parties oppose abortion. However, the first party opposes 
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abortion in a more extremist fashion than the second party. Any number of factors may 
shape how individuals align with certain issues. One study suggests that lack of 
understanding of complex policies accounts for polarization to a particular extreme.38  
Following this study’s findings, polarization to one extreme or another with respect to 
healthcare reform may come about due to a lack of understanding of the complex policies 
underlying PPACA. In which case, advocacy and education may prove beneficial. 
 In the world of extremist and moderate politics in healthcare reform, Ohio 
presents an interesting case study. The governor of Ohio—Governor Kasich—affiliates 
with the Republican Party.39  However, Governor Kasich classifies as a “moderate” with 
respect to many issues, including healthcare reform. In fact, under Governor Kasich’s 
leadership, Ohio embraced the traditional Medicaid expansion outlined in PPACA.39  
 States also have the option of submitting a 1115 waiver—subject to federal 
approval—to employ an alternative plan to expand coverage.40  Through 1115 waivers, 
states may still expand coverage under Medicaid but bypass the traditional expansion 
under PPACA. Utilizing this process may implicate more of an attention to policy than 
political resilience considering it results in expanding coverage. Still, this process may 
also implicate political resilience since it allows states to subsidize private insurance, not 
necessarily Medicaid under PPACA. Section 1115 waivers, therefore, fall into an 
inexplicable nebulous with respect to deciphering the policy and political motives for 
Medicaid expansion in states under PPACA. 
Economics, Budget Shortages, and Cost Sharing 
 In addition to political party influence, principles of economics may direct politics 
and decisions whether to embrace legislation.34  In a discussion regarding economics and 
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public policy, the distinguished Dr. Merl Hackbart of the University of Kentucky Martin 
School of Public Policy and Administration said, “in politics, ‘the future is tomorrow.’”41  
Dr. Hackbart described how governments typically operate by seeking immediate results. 
This principle opposes the long-term nature of public health goals.42  Thus, a tension 
exists between politicians and public health advocates when deciding whether to embrace 
legislation that has both short- and long-term effects. 
In the context of healthcare reform, expanding Medicaid will provide coverage 
eligibility to millions of Americans. Health care coverage may allow access to health 
care—a promotor of health outcomes. Moreover, PPACA emphasizes primary care and 
preventive efforts. Such efforts would make and keep the population healthier and, 
therefore, reduce the need to pay for costly services to treat acute and chronic conditions. 
In turn, the American healthcare system may see long-term cost savings and a reduction 
in the nation’s overall health care costs. However, according to Dr. Hackbart, politicians 
act with a more immediate focus. Thus, the short-term effects of cost may overshadow 
the long-term investments. As a result, the public health agenda may fail when facing the 
political agenda. For instance, expanding Medicaid requires resources. Some states may 
not have the resources to support expansion.29 Immediate budgetary concerns may, 
therefore, account for an inability to embrace PPACA and advance its policy goals.  
Furthermore, cost sharing and other financing likely influence decisions to 
embrace PPACA. The federal government and states jointly fund the Medicaid program. 
Wealthier states are required to pay a larger percentage of overall funding than poorer 
states. Additionally, PPACA provides for a stepwise decrease in federal funding. Thus, 
over the years, state financing obligations will increase. Some states may have difficulty 
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in meeting the financial demands to keep Medicaid functioning. In other words, it may be 
too costly to expand Medicaid. States—especially states with a massive uninsured 
population—may not have the fiscal capacity to absorb Medicaid costs.43-44  Additionally, 
states can choose how they allocate their budget. Some states may choose to invest more 
per capita on programs such as education, which may leave only limited resources for 
health care and programs such as Medicaid. As previously noted, Governor Rick Perry of 
Texas expressed a desire to reform Medicaid on “Texas’ terms,” describing the 
“crushing” weight of Medicaid costs on Texas infrastructure.29  Texas infrastructure may 
vary considerably from that of other states and, therefore, require attention to different 
programs to meet its needs. In other words, some states may designate health care as a 
lower priority than other programs and, therefore, choose not to expand Medicaid due to 
spending concerns.44 
 
SUMMARY 
Prior to the major insurance provisions of PPACA, the United States healthcare 
system was characterized by poor performance and quality. Additionally, America spent 
more on health care than any other country in the world. In other words, America 
invested a lot of resources only to not get results. A vast population of Americans did not 
have health care coverage. As a result, many Americans did not have access to health 
care—a promotor of health outcomes. To address these issues, the Obama Administration 
developed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).  
 PPACA focuses on primary care and preventive efforts, effectively incentivizes 
obtaining health insurance, and extends coverage eligibility to an additional 16 million 
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Americans. Extending coverage may allow millions of Americans to access health care. 
Access to care may, in turn, promote health. 
 PPACA is a product of public health policy—characterized by a focus on 
preventive and upstream action to address the health of the population. The public health 
policy of PPACA serves as a foundation to improve the health status of the population 
and to achieve the goals of PPACA. However, if public health policy achieves its goals, 
the nation will not notice it according to the paradox of prevention. Nonetheless, efforts 
ensue considering public health advocates believe that health is a human right. PPACA 
allows millions of Americans to have coverage and, in turn, access to health care. Under 
PPACA, millions of Americans may see better health outcomes. In summary, PPACA 
comports with public health policy and aims to improve the health status of the 
population. 
 Despite compelling public health policy reasons to embrace PPACA, many states 
and others opposed PPACA and sought to strike down its key provisions. With respect to 
the Medicaid expansion provision, opponents partially succeeded in a favorable Supreme 
Court decision in Sebelius which gave states the choice whether to opt into the Medicaid 
expansion outlined in PPACA, develop an alternative plan—subject to federal 
approval—to expand health insurance coverage under Medicaid, or do neither. Politics 
likely guided states in making their decisions. 
 In the world of politics, party affiliation and economics likely play the greatest 
roles. Most opposition to legislation comes from parties that did not develop it. This 
suggests that parties will resist enactments by their opponent parties. Despite policy 
rationales, political motives may guide executive and legislative decision-making.  
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America’s bipartisan system of government creates a divide and introduces 
barriers to achieving the policy goals of legislation. For example, since a Democratic 
administration enacted PPACA, it makes sense politically for Democratic states to 
embrace PPACA and Republican states to oppose it even if policy supports a different 
outcome. In short, states may not adequately consider policy during the executive or 
legislative decision-making process. 
In the context of Medicaid expansion under PPACA, economics may somewhat 
explain decision-making in states. A state may consider how Medicaid expansion will 
affect its budget in coming years. States may assess whether they have the fiscal capacity 
to absorb Medicaid costs when federal funding incrementally decreases and places more 
of a financial responsibility on states through cost-sharing ratios. States may choose to 
invest more per capita on programs other than Medicaid and, therefore, choose not to 
expand Medicaid due to spending concerns. This study merely discusses economics 
conceptually.  
Limitations 
Along with party affiliation and economics, a tremendous array of factors 
influences executive and legislative decisions in states. In reality, variable interactions 
and omitted variables probably play a role in decision-making outcomes. However, due 
to the extraordinary complexities in the national landscape of healthcare reform, this 
study does not adjust for state economic factors, cost sharing ratios, per capita spending, 
demographics, sociological factors, racial bias, or other factors that vary across the 
nation. This study takes a limited approach to target certain variables of interest and 
reveal potential relationships at a broad level. Thus, findings may be confounded. 
22  
Nonetheless, this study aims to analyze the two most likely influences—the 
potential impact on the uninsured and party affiliation—on decisions, potentially driven 
by policy or politics, regarding Medicaid expansion. 
Contributions to the Field 
In politics, “the future is tomorrow.” This mantra contrasts the long-term nature of 
public health goals. Thus, a tension exists between politicians and public health advocates 
when deciding whether to embrace legislation that has both short- and long-term effects. 
Politicians, voters, and all else must understand both the short- and long-term effects of 
legislation. Maybe then, more people will understand the need to promote health and how 
public health can achieve that goal. This paper serves as a bridge between public health 
and law regarding policy and politics. Principles identified and discussed in this paper 
may prove useful when analyzing future legislation. Ultimately, this study may reveal a 
greater need for public health advocacy in order to overcome political barriers to 
achieving the policy goals of legislation. 
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Methodology 
This is a cross-sectional/observational study of American states and the District of 
Columbia after the Sebelius decision in 2012. As previously discussed, this study 
compares three variables: (1) whether each state decided to opt into the expansion 
(“Opted In”), (2) whether each state’s governor and legislature were affiliated with either 
the Democratic or Republican party at the time of its decision (“Party”), and (3) the 
potential impact of Medicaid expansion on the uninsured population of each state 
(“Uninsured”). “Opted In” serves as the dependent variable; “Party” serves as the 
political independent variable; and “Uninsured” serves as the policy independent 
variable. This study utilizes analysis of variance (ANOVA), chi-squared testing, and 
hypothesis testing between statistics to analyze relationships between variables. 
Specifically, this study compares the “Opted In” variable with both the “Uninsured” and 
“Party” variables, as well as the “Party” variable with the “Uninsured” variable. 
Ultimately, this study aims to answer two questions. First, is there a relationship between 
policy and executive or legislative decision-making in states? Second, is there a 
relationship between politics and executive or legislative decision-making in states? 
Research Methodology 
The “Opted In” variable is dichotomous. A value of 1 indicates that a particular 
state opted into the expansion or developed an alternative plan to expand health insurance 
coverage, and a value of 0 indicates a particular state chose not to expand Medicaid. 
Information necessary to assign such values comes from the Kaiser Family Foundation 
(KFF), according to information from the Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and the National 
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Academy for State Health Policy (NASHP).39, 45-46  KFF, DHHS, CMS, and NASHP 
directly deal with the issue at hand and therefore have valid and reliable information 
regarding state health insurance exchanges. Table 1 portrays data for the 50 states and the 
District of Columbia.  
The “Party” variable is dichotomous. A value of 1 indicates a particular state’s 
governor or legislature affiliated with the Democratic Party at the time of its decision 
regarding Medicaid expansion. A value of 0 indicates affiliation with the Republican 
Party. CMS has not imposed a deadline for deciding to expand coverage under PPACA 
or through an alternative plan.47  Therefore, data for party affiliation of each state’s 
governor and legislature must correspond to the year in which each state made a decision 
regarding Medicaid expansion. Necessary data is recorded under the “Year of Decision” 
column in tables 1 and 2. Furthermore, the method for each decision dictates whether the 
party affiliation of the governor or legislature of each state is used for analysis. For 
example, some states employed a process through which the legislature developed and 
approved legislation for the Governor to sign into law.39, 48-49  Other states, such as 
Kentucky, embraced or rejected PPACA via executive orders that did not require 
approval by its legislature.39, 48-49  With respect to data gathering, states that employed the 
latter are denoted “Exec” on tables 1 and 2 under the “Executive/Legislative” column. 
States with legislative enactments are classified “Exec/Legis”. Party affiliation reflects 
the party affiliation of the branch that effectuated each state’s decision in the respective 
year up through 2016, if party affiliation differs between the governor and legislature.35  
If the state was a split-party state and the method of decision-making did not involve an 
executive order or if that state has decided not to expand Medicaid, that state receives no 
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value for the “Party” variable, considering the balance of party influence. If the state’s 
governor and legislature affiliated with the same party, data for that dominant party for 
that year is used. For states that expanded coverage, data for decisions and party 
affiliation are up to date through 2016. Additionally, data for party affiliation in states 
that have decided not to expand Medicaid reflect the 2013 year—the year after Sebelius 
when the majority of states made decisions regarding expanding coverage.35, 50 The 
National Conference of States Legislatures (NCSL) for 2013 and respective years of 
states’ decisions have the necessary information to assign values for the “Party” variable 
in tables 1 and 2.35, 50  The NCSL possesses valid and reliable information pertaining to 
executive party affiliation and political party control of state legislatures for each year. 
Table 1 portrays data for the 50 states and the District of Columbia. 
“Uninsured”, a continuous variable, quantifies the potential impact expanding 
coverage could have on uninsured populations by measuring the percentage of uninsured 
citizens in each state. That measure requires several assumptions. First, uninsured rates—
prior to expansion—remain relatively constant. CMS has not imposed a deadline for 
deciding to expand coverage under PPACA or through an alternative plan.47  
Additionally, the percentage of uninsured Americans in each state is taken at a point in 
time—2013, the year following Sebelius.19  In the timespan states may implement 
PPACA or alternative plans for expanding coverage, percentages of uninsured Americans 
may vary from the values for 2013. Still, the majority of states that made decisions to 
expand coverage did so in 2013. Table 1. Therefore, data from 2013 is used. Second, the 
expansion would result in coverage of uninsured citizens. It is possible the same 
individuals eligible for coverage after the expansion would refuse to enroll and accept the 
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payment requirement to the IRS.2  Third, the expansion will primarily affect the 
uninsured population of each state. The Medicaid expansion primarily targets low-
income citizens.3  The 2013 census for “Health Insurance Coverage in the United States” 
indicates most uninsured Americans fall under 100% of the federal poverty level.51 Thus, 
the percentage of uninsured citizens in each state serves as an appropriate measure for the 
potential impact of expanding coverage under Medicaid. Given each assumption, the 
aforementioned measure serves as a solid indication of what governors and legislatures 
may consider when deciding whether to opt into the expansion. KFF thoroughly tracks 
rates of uninsured populations, according to information from the United States Census 
Bureau. Thus, KFF possesses valid and reliable information pertaining to rates of 
uninsured populations. Considering states vary in population size, percentages are used to 
emphasize relativity. Table 1 portrays data for the 50 states and the District of Columbia. 
Tables 1 and 2 also include data indicating whether particular states were party to 
Sebelius, for comparative purposes.52  
Study Sample 
This study sample excludes states that developed alternative plans through section 
1115 waivers to expand coverage (Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Montana, and 
New Hampshire).39-40, 48  Table 1. States embracing some form of expanded coverage 
implicates more of an attention to policy than political resilience. However, political 
resilience may also account for the push for alternative plans. Thus, excluding such states 
reduces error and increase validity and reliability of results. 
The study sample also excludes split-party states that did not embrace PPACA 
under executive orders (New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island) or chose not to 
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expand coverage (Maine, Missouri, and Virginia), considering the impossibility to 
decipher party influence.39, 49  Table 1. In those split-party states, it is unclear whether 
decisions were primarily driven by a particular party’s influence. For the purposes of this 
study, party influence is essential to assess a potential relationship between political 
motives and executive or legislative decision-making in states. 
Analysis and Instrumentation 
 This study utilizes analysis of variance (ANOVA), chi-squared testing, and 
hypothesis testing between statistics to reveal potential relationships between variables. 
(1) Between the “Opted In” and “Uninsured” variables, this study: (a) employs an 
ANOVA test to assess whether variance exists in uninsured rates among states that either 
opted into the expansion, developed an alternative plan, or chose not to expand Medicaid; 
and (b) employs a 2-sample t-test under the assumption of unequal variances. (2) 
Between the “Opted In” and “Party” variables, this study: (a) employs chi-squared 
testing; and (b) employs a 2-sample z-test, considering proportions reflect party 
affiliation between states that opted into the expansion and those that chose not to expand 
Medicaid. (3) Between the “Party” and “Uninsured” variables, this study: (a) employs an 
ANOVA test to assess whether variance exists in uninsured rates among states that 
classify as either Democratic, Republican, or other (independent or no-value states) 
according to tables 1 and 2; and (b) employs a 2-sample t-test under the assumption of 
unequal variances. Microsoft® Excel® Version 14.5.2 for Mac 2011 was utilized to 
conduct necessary tests. 
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Hypotheses 
1. For the “Opted In” and “Uninsured” variables: it is hypothesized that analysis 
will reveal a statistically significant difference between the two variables. Under the 
ANOVA test, it is hypothesized that variance exists in uninsured rates among states that 
either opted into the expansion, developed an alternative plan, or chose not to expand 
Medicaid. In other words, this study expects to find a p-value small enough to allow 
rejection of the null hypothesis that no variance exists in uninsured rates among states 
that either opted into the expansion, developed an alternative plan, or chose not to expand 
Medicaid (𝐻":	  𝜇& = 𝜇( = 𝜇)). This study also employs a 2-sample t-test under the 
assumption of unequal variances. Under the 2-sample t-test, this study expects to find a p-
value small enough to allow rejection of the null hypothesis that there is no difference 
between states that opted to expand coverage and those that did not, based on potential 
impact on the uninsured (𝐻" − 𝐻+ = 0). Thus, it is predicted there is a relationship 
between policy and executive and legislative decision-making. 
2. For the “Opted In” and “Party” variables: it is hypothesized that analysis will 
reveal a statistically significant difference between the two variables. This study employs 
chi-squared testing to assess how well the data align with expected results and whether 
the data are independent or related. The chi-squared test assesses the proportions of 
Democratic, Republican, and split-party states that either opted in or out of the expansion, 
or developed an alternative plan to expand coverage. It is hypothesized that political party 
affiliation and decisions regarding Medicaid expansion are related. In other words, this 
study expects to find a p-value small enough to allow rejection of the null hypothesis that 
states’ decisions whether to opt into the Medicaid expansion and party affiliation are 
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independent (𝐻": "Opted In" and “Party” are independent). This study also employs a 2-
sample z-test, considering proportions reflect party affiliation between states that opted 
into the expansion and those that chose not to expand Medicaid. Under the 2-sample z-
test, this study expects to find a p-value small enough to allow rejection of the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference between the proportion of states that opted to 
expand coverage and the proportion of those that did not, based on party affiliation (𝑃& −𝑃( ≤ 0). Thus, it is predicted there is a relationship between politics and executive and 
legislative decision-making. 
3. For the “Party” and “Uninsured” variables: it is hypothesized that analysis will 
reveal a statistically significant difference between the two variables. Under the ANOVA 
test, it is hypothesized that variance exists in uninsured rates among states that classify as 
either Democratic, Republican, or other (independent or no-value states) according to 
tables 1 and 2. In other words, this study expects to find a p-value small enough to allow 
rejection of the null hypothesis that no variance exists in uninsured rates among states 
that classify as either Democratic, Republican, or other (𝐻":	  𝜇& = 𝜇( = 𝜇)). This study 
also employs a 2-sample t-test under the assumption of unequal variances. Under the 2-
sample t-test, this study expects to find a p-value small enough to allow rejection of the 
null hypothesis that there is no difference in uninsured rates between states that differ 
with respect to party affiliation (𝐻" − 𝐻+ = 0). Thus, it is predicted Democratic and 
Republican states likely have different rates of uninsured citizens. 
An array of descriptive statistics fully captures the essence of the data; including, 
ranges, minimums and maximums, and sample means (𝑥) ± standard deviations (s), 
among others. The following results reflect comparative and statistical data analysis.  
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Results 
DATA PRIOR TO EXCLUSION 
 Prior to exclusion, this study gathered data from the 50 states and the District of 
Columbia. Of the 51 subjects, 32 (63%) opted into expanding coverage under PPACA or 
through an alternative plan, and 19 (37%) chose not to expand Medicaid. The mean 
percentage of uninsured citizens among all 51 subjects was 12.22 ± 3.65 and ranged from 
4% (Massachusetts (D)) to 20% (Nevada (R) and Texas (R)). Additionally, 16 subjects 
(31%) affiliated with the Democratic Party compared to 24 (47%) that affiliated with the 
Republican Party. Table 1. 
 Of the 51 subjects in the study, 26 (51%) were party to Sebelius. Among the 26 
that were party to Sebelius, 14 (54%) chose not to expand Medicaid. The mean 
percentage of uninsured citizens for subjects that were party to Sebelius was 13.38 ± 
3.54, and ranged from 9% (Iowa (split), South Dakota (R), and Wisconsin (R)) to 20% 
(Nevada (R) and Texas (R)). Moreover, 20 of the 26 subjects (77%) affiliated with the 
Republican Party. Table 1. 
Hypotheses 
1. For the “Opted In” and “Uninsured” variables: it was hypothesized that 
analysis would find a statistically significant difference between the two variables. Under 
the ANOVA test, it was hypothesized that variance exists in uninsured rates among states 
that either opted into the expansion, developed an alternative plan, or chose not to expand 
Medicaid. In other words, this study expected to find a p-value small enough to allow 
rejection of the null hypothesis that no variance exists in uninsured rates among states 
that either opted into the expansion, developed an alternative plan, or chose not to expand 
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Medicaid (𝐻":	  𝜇& = 𝜇( = 𝜇)). The 26 subjects that opted into the expansion have a mean 
percentage of uninsured citizens of 11.35 ± 3.90, ranging from 4% (Massachusetts (D)) to 
20% (Nevada (R)). The mean percentage of uninsured citizens for the 6 subjects that 
developed an alternative plan to expand coverage was 12.17 ± 2.40 and ranged from 9% 
(Iowa (split)) to 15% (Arkansas (split) and Montana (split)). The 19 subjects that chose 
not to expand Medicaid have a mean percentage of uninsured citizens of 13.42 ± 3.36, 
ranging from 9% (South Dakota (R) and Wisconsin (R)) to 20% (Texas (R)). Consistent 
with the initial hypothesis, a cursory review of the data suggest variance exists in 
uninsured rates among states that either opted into the expansion, developed an 
alternative plan, or chose not to expand Medicaid. However, an ANOVA test yielded a p-
value of 0.16730 which is too high to allow rejection of the null hypothesis. Thus, this 
study fails to reject the null hypothesis that no variance exists in uninsured rates among 
states that either opted into the expansion, developed an alternative plan, or chose not to 
expand Medicaid (𝐻":	  𝜇& = 𝜇( = 𝜇)). 
2. For the “Opted In” and “Party” variables: it was hypothesized that analysis 
would find a statistically significant difference between the two variables. For all subjects 
prior to exclusion, this study employed chi-squared testing to assess how well the data 
align with expected results and whether the data are independent or related. The chi-
squared test assessed the proportions of Democratic, Republican, and split-party states 
that either opted in or out of the expansion, or developed an alternative plan to expand 
coverage. Results are shown below: 
 
 
32  
 Democratic Republican Split Total 
Opted-In 15 4 7 26 
Opted-Out 0 16 3 19 
Alternative 0 2 4 6 
Total 15 22 14 51 
Chi-Squared Statistic: 30.9348 
P-Value: < 0.00001 
 
It was hypothesized that the chi-squared test would find that the variables are 
related. In other words, this study expected to find a p-value small enough to allow 
rejection of the null hypothesis that states’ decisions whether to opt into the Medicaid 
expansion and party affiliation are independent 
(𝐻": "Opted In" and “Party” are independent). The chi-squared test yielded a p-value of < 
0.00001. This p-value is low enough to allow rejection of the null hypothesis that states’ 
decisions whether to opt into the Medicaid expansion and party affiliation are 
independent (𝐻+: "Opted In" and “Party” are not	  independent). Therefore, states’ 
decisions and party affiliation, i.e. politics, are likely related.          
3. For the “Party” and “Uninsured” variables: it was hypothesized that analysis 
would find a statistically significant difference between the two variables. Under the 
ANOVA test, it was hypothesized that variance exists in uninsured rates among states 
that classify as either Democratic, Republican, or other (independent or no-value states) 
according to tables 1 and 2. In other words, this study expected to find a p-value small 
enough to allow rejection of the null hypothesis that no variance exists in uninsured rates 
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among states that classify as either Democratic, Republican, or other (𝐻":	  𝜇& = 𝜇( = 𝜇)). 
The 16 subjects that classified as Democratic have a mean percentage of uninsured 
citizens of 9.75 ± 3.17, ranging from 4% (Massachusetts (D)) to 15% (California (D)). 
The mean percentage of uninsured citizens for the 24 subjects that classified as 
Republican was 14.08 ± 3.37 and ranged from 9% (South Dakota (R) and Wisconsin (R)) 
to 20% (Nevada (R) and Texas (R)). The 11 subjects that classified as other (independent 
or no-value states) have a mean percentage of uninsured citizens of 11.73 ± 2.49, ranging 
from 9% (Iowa and Rhode Island) to 16% (Alaska). Consistent with the initial 
hypothesis, a cursory review of the data suggest variance exists in uninsured rates among 
states that classified as either Democratic, Republican, or other (independent or no-value 
states) according to tables 1 and 2. An ANOVA test yielded a p-value of 0.00040. This 
low p-value allows rejection of the null hypothesis that no variance exists in uninsured 
rates among states that classify as either Democratic, Republican, or other (𝐻+:	  𝜇& ≠𝜇( ≠ 𝜇)). 
 
DATA FOLLOWING EXCLUSION 
Following exclusion of states for reasons described in the methodology, the study 
sample consisted of 37 states and the District of Columbia (N = 38). Of the 38 subjects, 
22 (58%) have opted into expanding coverage under PPACA, and 16 (42%) have chosen 
not to expand Medicaid. The mean percentage of uninsured citizens in the total sample 
was 12.39 ± 4.00 and ranged from 4% (Massachusetts (D)) to 20% (Nevada (R) and 
Texas (R)). Additionally, 16 subjects (42%) affiliated with the Democratic Party 
compared to 22 (58%) that affiliated with the Republican Party. Table 2.  
34  
Of the 38 subjects in the sample, 20 (53%) were party to Sebelius. Among the 20 
that were party to Sebelius, 13 (65%) chose not to expand Medicaid. The mean 
percentage of uninsured citizens for subjects that were party to Sebelius was 14.00 ± 
3.63, and ranged from 9% (South Dakota (R) and Wisconsin (R)) to 20% (Nevada (R) 
and Texas (R)). Moreover, 18 of the 20 subjects (90%) affiliated with the Republican 
Party. Table 2.  
Hypotheses 
1. For the “Opted In” and “Uninsured” variables: it was hypothesized that 
analysis would find a statistically significant difference between the two variables. In 
other words, this study expected to find a p-value small enough to allow rejection of the 
null hypothesis that there is no difference between states that opted to expand coverage 
and those that did not, based on potential impact on the uninsured (𝐻" − 𝐻+ = 0). Thus, 
it was predicted there is a relationship between policy and executive and legislative 
decision-making. The 22 subjects that opted into the expansion have a mean percentage 
of uninsured citizens of 11.27 ± 4.08, ranging from 4% (Massachusetts (D)) to 20% 
(Nevada (R)). The mean percentage of uninsured citizens for the 16 subjects that chose 
not to expand Medicaid was 13.94 ± 3.42 and ranged from 9% (South Dakota (R) and 
Wisconsin (R)) to 20% (Texas (R)). Consistent with the initial hypothesis, the data 
suggest a difference between states that opted to expand coverage and those that did not, 
based on potential impact on the uninsured. However, data also suggest that states with 
higher rates of uninsured citizens did not expand coverage. This possible conclusion is 
inconsistent with the policy rationale of expanding coverage—to assist uninsured citizens 
in obtaining health insurance. Nonetheless, a 2-sample t-test under the assumption of 
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unequal variances yielded a p-value of 0.03562. This low p-value allows rejection of the 
null hypothesis that there is no difference between states that opted to expand coverage 
and those that did not, based on potential impact on the uninsured (𝐻" − 𝐻+ = 0). Thus, 
there is a relationship between policy and executive and legislative decision-making on 
the issue at hand, even though the direction of influence is inconsistent with the policy 
rationale of expanding coverage eligibility to address the massive uninsured population 
(𝐻" − 𝐻+ ≠ 0). 
2. For the “Opted In” and “Party” variables: it was hypothesized that analysis 
would find a statistically significant difference between the two variables. Under	  a	  2-­‐‑sample,	  1-­‐‑tailed	  z-­‐‑test,	  this	  study	  expected	  to	  find	  a	  p-­‐‑value	  small	  enough	  to	  allow	  rejection	  of	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  there	  is	  no	  difference	  between	  the	  proportion	  of	  states	  that	  opted	  to	  expand	  coverage	  and	  the	  proportion	  of	  those	  that	  did	  not,	  based	  on	  party	  affiliation	  (𝑃& − 𝑃( ≤ 0).	  Thus,	  it	  was	  predicted	  there	  is	  a	  relationship	  between	  politics	  and	  executive	  and	  legislative	  decision-­‐‑making.	  Of	  the	  22	  subjects	  that	  chose	  to	  embrace	  PPACA,	  16	  affiliated	  with	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  (73%)	  and	  6	  affiliated	  with	  the	  Republican	  Party	  (27%).	  All	  16	  subjects	  that	  chose	  not	  to	  embrace	  PPACA	  affiliated	  with	  the	  Republican	  Party	  (100%).	  Thus,	  a	  proportion	  of	  0.73	  ±	  0.46	  subjects	  opted	  into	  the	  expansion	  and	  affiliated	  with	  the	  Democratic	  Party,	  compared	  to	  a	  proportion	  of	  0.00	  ±	  0.00	  subjects	  that	  chose	  not	  to	  expand	  Medicaid	  and	  affiliated	  with	  the	  Democratic	  Party.	  It	  appears	  a	  difference	  exists	  between	  subjects	  that	  opted	  to	  expand	  coverage	  and	  those	  that	  did	  not,	  based	  on	  party	  affiliation.	  A	  2-­‐‑sample,	  1-­‐‑tailed	  z-­‐‑test	  yielded	  a	  p-­‐‑value	  of	  0.00968.	  This	  low	  p-­‐‑value	  allows	  rejection	  of	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  there	  is	  no	  difference	  between	  the	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proportion	  of	  states	  that	  opted	  to	  expand	  coverage	  and	  the	  proportion	  of	  those	  that	  did	  not,	  based	  on	  party	  affiliation	  (𝑃& − 𝑃( ≤ 0).	  Thus,	  there	  is	  a	  relationship	  between	  politics	  and	  executive	  and	  legislative	  decision-­‐‑making	  (𝑃& − 𝑃( > 0).	  	  
3. For the “Party” and “Uninsured” variables: it was hypothesized that analysis 
would find a statistically significant difference between the two variables. In other words, 
this study expected to find a p-value small enough to allow rejection of the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference in uninsured rates between states that differ with 
respect to party affiliation (𝐻" − 𝐻+ = 0). Thus, it was predicted Democratic and 
Republican states likely have different rates of uninsured citizens. The 16 subjects in the 
sample that affiliated with the Democratic Party have a mean percentage of uninsured 
citizens of 9.75 ± 3.17 that ranged from 4% (Massachusetts) to 15% (California). The 22 
subjects that affiliated with the Republican Party have a mean percentage of 14.32 ± 3.43, 
ranging from 9% (South Dakota and Wisconsin) to 20% (Nevada and Texas). Consistent 
with the initial hypothesis, the data suggest a difference in uninsured rates between states 
that differ with respect to party affiliation. A 2-sample t-test under the assumption of 
unequal variances yielded a p-value of 0.00017. This low p-value allows rejection of the 
null hypothesis that there is no difference in uninsured rates between states that differ 
with respect to party affiliation (𝐻" − 𝐻+ = 0). Thus, Democratic and Republican states 
have statistically different rates of uninsured citizens (𝐻" − 𝐻+ ≠ 0). Specifically, 
Republican states have higher rates of uninsured citizens than Democratic states. 
 In summary, comparative and statistical data analysis suggests there is a 
relationship between both policy and politics, and executive and legislative decision-
making. The direction of influence of policy implications regarding the uninsured is 
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inconsistent with PPACA’s policy rationale of expanding coverage eligibility under 
Medicaid to address the massive uninsured population. However, Republican states have 
higher rates of uninsured citizens than Democratic states. Therefore, inconsistencies may 
be incidental to overall political influence and social structure within states. 
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Discussion 
 At a broad level, considering this study’s limitations, one implication of this 
study’s findings is that states do not adequately consider public health policy when 
making executive or legislative decisions. 
Prior to the major insurance provisions of PPACA, the United States healthcare 
system was characterized by poor performance and quality. Additionally, America spent 
more on health care than any other country in the world. In other words, America 
invested a lot of resources only to not get results. A vast population of Americans did not 
have health care coverage. As a result, many Americans did not have access to health 
care—a promotor of health outcomes. To address these issues, the Obama Administration 
developed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).  
 PPACA focuses on primary care and preventive efforts, effectively incentivizes 
obtaining health insurance, and extends coverage eligibility to millions of Americans. 
Extending coverage may allow millions of Americans to access health care. Access to 
care may, in turn, promote health. 
 PPACA is a product of public health policy—characterized by a focus on 
preventive and upstream action to address the health of the population. The public health 
policy of PPACA serves as a foundation to improve the health status of the population 
and achieve the goals of PPACA. However, if public health policy achieves its goals, the 
nation will not notice it according to the paradox of prevention. Nonetheless, efforts 
ensue considering public health advocates believe that health is a human right. PPACA 
allows millions of Americans to have coverage and, in turn, access to health care. Under 
PPACA, millions of Americans may see better health outcomes. In summary, PPACA 
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comports with public health policy and aims to improve the health status of the 
population. 
 Despite compelling public health policy reasons to embrace PPACA, many states 
and private sector organizations opposed PPACA and sought to strike down its key 
provisions. With respect to the Medicaid expansion provision, opponents partially 
succeeded in a favorable Supreme Court decision in Sebelius which gave states the 
choice whether to opt into the Medicaid expansion outlined in PPACA, develop an 
alternative plan—subject to federal approval—to expand health insurance coverage under 
Medicaid, or do neither. Politics likely guided states in making their decisions. 
 In the world of politics, party affiliation and economics likely play the greatest 
roles. Most opposition to legislation comes from parties that did not develop it. This 
suggests that parties will resist enactments by their opponent parties. Despite policy 
rationales, political motives may guide executive and legislative decision-making.  
America’s bipartisan system of government creates a divide and introduces 
barriers to achieving the policy goals of legislation. For example, in 2013, Texas had the 
highest rate of uninsured citizens in the nation and, therefore, had an opportunity to make 
a significant impact on reducing the uninsured population. Table 1. However, Texas 
fought PPACA more adamantly than most other states. Texas closely affiliates with the 
Republican Party. Thus, while Texas could have made a tremendous impact in advancing 
PPACA’s policy goal of expanding coverage eligibility to address the massive uninsured 
population, it chose not to. It is possible that economics, fiscal concerns, and per capita 
spending, among other factors, played a role in its decision. Politics is another 
explanation. 
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 Texas is not alone. According to the results of this study, the states that chose not 
to expand Medicaid affiliated only with the Republican Party. Moreover, all states that 
affiliated with the Democratic Party embraced PPACA. Table 2. A cursory review of the 
data clearly depicts this divide. Moreover, a divide exists between states that opted to 
expand coverage and those that did not, based on potential impact on the uninsured. 
Statistical analysis suggests there is a relationship between policy and executive and 
legislative decision-making. However, the results also reveal that the states—like 
Texas—that had the highest rates of uninsured citizens were the states that chose not to 
expand Medicaid. This finding is inconsistent with the policy rationale of expanding 
Medicaid to assist uninsured populations. If a state has a large uninsured population, 
embracing the expansion could significantly advance the policy goals of PPACA. 
However, the states that had the greatest opportunity to advance PPACA’s policy goals 
were the states that chose not to expand Medicaid. 
 Statistical analysis of states’ decisions regarding Medicaid expansion and political 
party affiliation also found significant results. Results suggests decisions and party 
affiliation are likely related. Thus, there is a relationship between politics and executive 
and legislative decision-making. 
Republican states, generally, chose not to expand Medicaid whereas Democratic 
states predominately embraced the expansion. In America’s bipartisan system of 
government with conflicting interests, it makes sense politically for Democratic states to 
embrace PPACA and Republican states to oppose it since a Democratic administration 
enacted PPACA. Nonetheless, states that need expanded coverage the most, the states 
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with the highest rates of uninsured citizens—Republican states, as the results found—did 
not embrace PPACA. 
This study’s findings pertaining to policy and decisions regarding Medicaid 
expansion are inconsistent with PPACA’s policy rationale of expanding	  coverage	  eligibility	  to	  address	  the	  massive	  uninsured	  population. At a broad level, considering 
this study’s limitations, it is inferable that states did not adequately consider the public 
health policy underlying PPACA when deciding whether to expand Medicaid. Other 
factors possibly influenced the states’ decisions. Nonetheless, the literature review and 
results suggest that political party affiliation is a viable and likely explanation. 
Economics may help explain decisions regarding Medicaid expansion under 
PPACA. A state may consider how Medicaid expansion will affect its budget in coming 
years. States may assess whether they have the fiscal capacity to absorb Medicaid costs 
when federal funding diminishes and places more of a financial responsibility on states. 
States may choose to invest more per capita on programs other than Medicaid and, 
therefore, choose not to expand Medicaid due to spending concerns. Future studies can 
look more thoroughly at the numbers behind the decisions, including: budget shortages, 
cost sharing ratios, fiscal capacities, and per capita spending, among others. This study 
merely discusses economics conceptually. However, the significant results with respect to 
political party affiliation suggest that politics guide the executive and legislative decision-
making process. 
In politics, “the future is tomorrow.” This mantra contrasts with the long-term 
nature of public health goals. Thus, a tension exists between politicians and public health 
advocates when deciding whether to embrace legislation that has both short- and long-
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term effects. Politicians and voters alike must understand both the short- and long-term 
effects of legislation. Maybe then, more people will understand the need to promote 
health and how public health coverage can achieve that goal. This analysis is intended as 
a bridge between public health and law regarding policy and politics. Principles identified 
and discussed in this paper may prove useful when analyzing future legislation. 
Ultimately, this analysis identifies a need for more effective public health advocacy in 
order to overcome political barriers to achieving the policy goals of legislation. 
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Table 1: Data for the 50 States and the District of Columbia 
 
 
State Opted(In((0(=(no,(1(=(yes) Party((0(=(R,(1(=(D) Uninsured((%) Executive/Legislative* Year(of(Decision Brought(Suit(in(Sebelius((0(=(no,(1(=(yes)
Alabama 0 0 16 N/A N/A 1
Alaska 1 N/A* 16 Exec 2015 1
Arizona 1 0 19 Exec/Legis 2013 1
Arkansas 1 15 Exec/Legis 2014 0
California 1 1 15 Exec/Legis 2013 0
Colorado 1 1 13 Exec 2013 1
Connecticut 1 1 9 Exec 2010 0
Delaware 1 1 7 Exec 2013 0
Florida 0 0 19 N/A N/A 1
Georgia 0 0 16 N/A N/A 1
Hawaii 1 1 5 Exec 2012 0
Idaho 0 0 14 N/A N/A 1
Illinois 1 1 11 Exec 2013 0
Indiana 1 0 12 Exec/Legis 2014 1
Iowa 1 9 Exec/Legis 2013 1
Kansas 0 0 10 N/A N/A 1
Kentucky 1 1 13 Exec 2013 0
Louisiana 1 0 12 Exec 2016 1
Maine 0 10 N/A N/A 1
Maryland 1 1 10 Exec/Legis 2013 0
Massachusetts 1 1 4 Exec/Legis 2013 0
Michigan 1 0 11 Exec/Legis 2013 1
Minnesota 1 1 7 Exec/Legis 2013 0
Mississippi 0 0 14 N/A N/A 1
Missouri 0 11 N/A N/A 0
Montana 1 15 Exec/Legis 2015 0
Nebraska* 0 0 10 N/A N/A 1
Nevada 1 0 20 Exec 2012 1
NewPHampshire 1 11 Exec/Legis 2014 0
NewPJersey 1 12 Exec/Legis 2013 0
NewPMexico 1 0 16 Exec 2013 0
NewPYork 1 1 9 Exec 2012 0
NorthPCarolina 0 0 16 N/A N/A 0
NorthPDakota 1 0 12 Exec/Legis 2013 1
Ohio 1 0 13 Exec/Legis 2013 1
Oklahoma 0 0 14 N/A N/A 0
Oregon 1 1 13 Exec/Legis 2013 0
Pennsylvania 1 10 Exec/Legis 2015 1
RhodePIsland 1 9 Exec/Legis 2013 0
SouthPCarolina 0 0 15 N/A N/A 1
SouthPDakota 0 0 9 N/A N/A 1
Tennessee 0 0 13 N/A N/A 0
Texas 0 0 20 N/A N/A 1
Utah 0 0 11 N/A N/A 1
Vermont 1 1 8 N/A* 2012 0
Virginia 0 11 N/A N/A 0
Washington 1 1 11 Exec/Legis 2013 1
WestPVirginia 1 1 13 Exec 2013 0
Wisconsin 0 0 9 N/A N/A 1
Wyoming 0 0 17 N/A N/A 1
DistrictPofPColumbia 1 1 8 Exec 2010 N/A
Party(Control: Key((as(of(2016): *Independent For(2013 *HCAPCommissioner
Republican OptedPInP=P1 12.21568627
Split AlternativePPlanP=P1 3.629400642
Democratic OptedPOutP=P0
*Unicameral
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Table 2: Data for the Study Sample (N = 38) 
 
State Opted(In((0(=(no,(1(=(yes) Party((0(=(R,(1(=(D) Uninsured((%) Executive/Legislative* Year(of(Decision Brought(Suit(in(Sebelius((0(=(no,(1(=(yes)
Arizona 1 0 19 Exec/Legis 2013 1
California 1 1 15 Exec/Legis 2013 0
Colorado 1 1 13 Exec 2013 1
Connecticut 1 1 9 Exec 2010 0
Delaware 1 1 7 Exec 2013 0
Hawaii 1 1 5 Exec 2012 0
Illinois 1 1 11 Exec 2013 0
Kentucky 1 1 13 Exec 2013 0
Louisiana 1 0 12 Exec 2016 1
Maryland 1 1 10 Exec/Legis 2013 0
Massachusetts 1 1 4 Exec/Legis 2013 0
Minnesota 1 1 7 Exec/Legis 2013 0
Nevada 1 0 20 Exec 2012 1
NewJMexico 1 0 16 Exec 2013 0
NewJYork 1 1 9 Exec 2012 0
NorthJDakota 1 0 12 Exec/Legis 2013 1
Ohio 1 0 13 Exec/Legis 2013 1
Oregon 1 1 13 Exec/Legis 2013 0
Vermont 1 1 8 N/A* 2012 0
Washington 1 1 11 Exec/Legis 2013 1
WestJVirginia 1 1 13 Exec 2013 0
DistrictJofJColumbia 1 1 8 Exec 2010 N/A
Alabama 0 0 16 N/A N/A 1
Florida 0 0 19 N/A N/A 1
Georgia 0 0 16 N/A N/A 1
Idaho 0 0 14 N/A N/A 1
Kansas 0 0 10 N/A N/A 1
Mississippi 0 0 14 N/A N/A 1
Nebraska* 0 0 10 N/A N/A 1
NorthJCarolina 0 0 16 N/A N/A 0
Oklahoma 0 0 14 N/A N/A 0
SouthJCarolina 0 0 15 N/A N/A 1
SouthJDakota 0 0 9 N/A N/A 1
Tennessee 0 0 13 N/A N/A 0
Texas 0 0 20 N/A N/A 1
Utah 0 0 11 N/A N/A 1
Wisconsin 0 0 9 N/A N/A 1
Wyoming 0 0 17 N/A N/A 1
Party(Control: Key((as(of(2016): For(2013 *HCAJCommissioner
Republican OptedJInJ=J1 12.39473684
Split AlternativeJPlanJ=J1 3.996887124
Democratic OptedJOutJ=J0
*Unicameral
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